Abstract-We defined a new notion of computational indistinguishability: termination-insensitive computational indistinguishability (tic-indistinguishability). Tic-indistinguishability models indistinguishability with respect to distinguishers that cannot distinguish between termination and non-termination.
I. INTRODUCTION
We present the notion of termination-insensitive computational indistinguishability (tic-indistinguishability for short). In a nutshell, two interactive machines A and B are ticindistinguishable (written: A ≈ tic B) if they cannot be distinguished by a distinguisher that is computationally limited, and that cannot distinguish between non-termination and termination of the machines it interacts with. That is, if for example upon some query A returns 1, and B never returns, A and B will be considered tic-indistinguishable. Furthermore, needing superpolynomial time for answering a request is treated as non-termination. That is, if B returns 0 after an exponential number of steps, we still have A ≈ tic B.
Before we explain how tic-indistinguishability can be formally defined, we present a motivating example that explains why such a notion can be necessary in the first place. Assume that we have designed a file server A that supports the following queries: Store content c under filename f . Read (part of) the content of file f . Concatenate the contents of two files f 1 , f 2 and store the result in file f 3 . Encrypt the content of file f 1 and store the result in file f 2 . (Encryption takes place with respect to some IND-CCA secure encryption scheme and some publicly known public key; the secret key is not revealed or even used. ) We wish to compare this file server with the file server B which, instead of encrypting the content of c of file f 1 , encrypts 0 |c| . Intuitively, we would expect that A and B are computationally indistinguishable. Typically, computational indistinguishability of interactive machines A and B would be defined by requiring that for any polynomial-time machine Z, Z cannot guess whether it interacts with A or with B. Consider the following Z: Z creates a file f 0 with content 1. Then, through a sequence of concatenation operations, Z creates polynomially-many files f i such that the content of f i is 1 What options do we have to resolve this issue?
• We could reject all machines that do not run in polynomial time and never even ask the question whether they are computationally indistinguishable. This would, however, exclude even such innocuous looking machines as our file server. And we believe that many practical systems do in fact have specifications that allow to perform operations that are not a priori bounded in their running time.
• We could try to strengthen the definition of IND-CCA security such that it allows to make A and B computationally indistinguishable. It is not clear whether such an approach is feasible in general. Anyway, it seems strange to introduce additional computational assumptions in order to avoid attacks that occur after a superpolynomial amount of time (from the point of view of cryptography, they never occur).
• One could try to define a notion of computational indistinguishability that requires A to answer in polynomialtime whenever B answers in polynomial-time, and that in this case the answers are indistinguishable. This is, however, not trivial to define, because there is no strict border between polynomial-time and superpolynomialtime (that is, one cannot specify a number t such that t steps would be polynomial-time, and t + 1 steps would be superpolynomial-time).
• One could require that machines have an additional "time-channel" over which they have to send messages in regular intervals (with only a polynomial number of steps passing between two messages). The machines will then be polynomial-time in the sense that between two activations, only polynomial time passes. Then to these modified machines, we can apply the classical notion of computational indistinguishability. However, applying computational indistinguishability means that the same number of "time-messages" must be sent by both machines. This will in general be quite hard to achieve because one machine will need to precisely know how many time-messages the other sends.
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• Or, one could use our notion of tic-indistinguishability.
We have A ≈ tic B because the encryption scheme can only leak information at a point where A and B are already considered non-terminating. One might complain that tic-indistinguishability is too weak a notion because it considers non-termination and termination to be indistinguishable although in practice, these are clearly distinguishable: We fix a suitable timeout, and once that timeout has elapsed, we can assume that the system we are communicating with does not terminate. One should observe, however, that the same applies when distinguishing machines with polynomial running times of, say, η 2 and η 100 . These can easily be distinguished by using a timeout, but commonly we treat them as indistinguishable because we choose to abstract away from timing issues. The alternative would be to explicitly model the timing; in this case tic-indistinguishability would not make sense. If we do, however, choose to abstract away from the running time, it seems natural not to make an exception for exponential running time. That is, if we cannot distinguish between η 2 and η 100 , we should also not distinguish between, say, η 2 and 2 η . On the other hand, after 2 η steps, the actual answer does not matter any more, so that answer should not be used to distinguish. This is exactly what ticindistinguishability does. Thus, from a more philosophical point of view, natural notions would be some kind of timingsensitive indistinguishability (if we consider timing), and ticindistinguishability (if we abstract away from timing), while normal computational indistinguishability seems to model a mixture of two approaches (considering and abstracting away from timing).
On the more practical side, we also explain below (Section I-D) that tic-indistinguishability allows to state certain computational soundness results 2 that would, with respect to computational indistinguishability, be subject to strong side-conditions.
Another application of tic-indistinguishability is to serve as a model in termination-insensitive information-flow analysis. The definition of termination-insensitive noninterference (see, e.g., [1] ) considers a program not to leak the information in the so-called "high variables" if no 1 Requiring only the messages on non-time-channels to be indistiguishable does not work either: In this case, sending time-messages has no effect at all, and thus the introduction of time-channels was useless. 2 A computational soundness result is a theorem that states that, if a protocol is shown secure in a symbolic model (a.k.a. Dolev-Yao model) using formal methods, then this protocol is also secure in a computational/cryptographic sense. adversary can distinguish between two executions of the program with two different assignments to the high variables. Here we consider two executions as indistinguishable if one of them does not terminate. The reason for considering termination-insensitive non-interference as opposed to the stronger termination-sensitive non-interference is that the latter is often much harder to analyze. However, when we perform an information-flow analysis in a computational setting (e.g., because we use encryptions in our program), it is not obvious how to formulate termination-insensitive non-interference in that setting. Tic-indistinguishability provides an approach to define termination-insensitive noninterference in the computational setting: One defines a program to satisfy termination-insensitive non-interference if two execution of that program with different assignments to the high variables are tic-indistinguishable.
Our contribution: We present the notion of ticindistinguishability. We show that the definition of ticindistinguishability is machine-model independent. We relate tic-indistinguishability to computational and statistical indistinguishability; this allows us to perform subproofs with respect to more familiar indistinguishability notions. We show how tic-indistinguishability can be used to get computational soundness results for equivalence-based security properties (such as anonymity) for processes that may contain loops, solving an open problem.
A. How to define tic-indistinguishability
In order to understand the definition of tic-indistinguishability, let us first consider a simpler case: We do not consider computational limitations of the distinguisher, we do not allow for a negligible probability of failure, and assume that the machines A and B that we distinguish are noninteractive and either output a bit b or run forever. Let p A b and p A ⊥ denote the probability that A outputs b or does not terminate, respectively. Define p B analogously. We will consider A and B as indistinguishable if we can redistribute the probability of non-termination onto the probabilities for the outputs 0 and 1 in such a way, that the probability distributions of the outputs of A and B become the same. (I.e., we treat the non-termination probability as a kind of "wildcard" that can be reinterpreted as any output.) More precisely, A and B are indistinguishable if there are valueŝ p
⊥ (this models that thê p X b are a redistribution of the non-termination probability) and such that p (this models that after redistributing probabilities, the output distributions of A and B are equal). One easily sees that sucĥ p Now, let us consider the case that A and B are arbitrary interactive machines. To cover this case, we introduce a distinguisher Z whose goal it is to interact with A and B and whose output represents a guess whether it is interacting with A or B. We also add the possibility of a negligible error. This leads to the following definition of indistinguishability: For any machine Z there is a negligible μ such that for all a = b,
Here Z + A ⇓ a denotes the event that an interaction between Z and A terminates and Z outputs a. (Notice that we use arbitrary a = b instead of 0, 1 to make the definition more symmetric. This is without loss of generality, a Z that distinguishes using outputs a, b can be converted into one that outputs 0, 1 instead.)
So far, we have not considered the running time of A, B, or Z, leading to a statistical notion of indistinguishability. To get a computational notion, we need to ensure two things: Z runs in polynomial time, and anything that A and B do after polynomial-time is not counted. In other words, we have to consider a polynomial-time prefix of the interaction between Z and A or B. This leads to the following definition: For any machine Z, all polynomials p, q, and all a = b,
Here Z + A ⇓ p a denotes the event that an interaction between Z and A terminates after at most p steps (counting the running time of both Z and A) and Z outputs a. Notice that if this condition is violated for some p, q, it is also violated for the polynomials p := p+q and q := p = p+q. Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume p = q. Thus our definition is ready:
Definition 1 (tic-indistinguishability -informal):
We call A and B tic-indistinguishable (A ≈ tic B) if for all machines Z and all polynomials p, there is a negligible μ such that for all a = b we have
B. Machine model independence
When considering Definition 1, one may fear that the definition is very sensitive to the underlying machine model. Instead of quantifying over all polynomial-time machines (which is a class that is equal for all common machine models), we explicitly consider the running time of the machines A and B and of the distinguisher Z.
Fortunately This lemma allow us to fix some machine model without loss of generality (say, Turing machines), while still getting results that apply to most natural machine models. Also, when describing machine A and B that we wish to compare, it is not necessary to exactly know the algorithm they use, it is only necessary to describe them up to time-equivalence. Thus the situation is comparable to the machine model independence that we have with computational indistinguishability.
C. Using tic-indistinguishability
In order to derive tic-indistinguishability of two machines, it is often not necessary to invoke the definition of ticindistinguishability directly. Instead, there are a few useful properties that allow to derive tic-indistinguishability from common indistinguishability notions.
First For example, if we want to show that A ≈ tic B were A and B are the file servers from our initial motivating example, we can proceed as follows: Let C be an implementation of the file server that invokes an external machine E for performing the encryptions. I.e., E behaves like an encryption oracle, and whenever C wishes to encrypt a message m, C sends m to E and E returns the ciphertext. Since outsourcing a computation incurs only a polynomialtime overhead, we have that A ≈ time C + E. Furthermore, This lemma allows to derive a tic-indistinguishability in a simpler setting (where B is replaced by some simpler but computationally indistinguishable A). This lemma is also used centrally in our computational soundness proof (see next section).
D. Computational soundness
There are two main approaches on how to model and verify the security of protocols. In the computational approach, protocol machines are modeled as computational entities (e.g., Turing machines) that send and receive bitstrings. Cryptographic operations on these bitstrings are modeled as algorithms on bitstrings; the adversary is allowed to perform any polynomial-time computation. In the symbolic approach, messages are not modeled as bitstrings, but as terms over a suitable algebra. The constructors in this algebra model the various available cryptographic operations (such as encryption). The adversary is limited to perform certain well-defined symbolic operations on the terms in his knowledge (e.g., an adversary can derive a plaintext m if and only if he knows the key k and the ciphertext enc(k, m)). Although the cryptographic approach comes much closer to reality, the symbolic approach is very popular because it allows for very powerful machine-assisted verification of the security of protocols. In order to get the best of both worlds, Abadi and Rogaway [3] suggested so-called computational soundness results. Such a result states, that, if a protocol is secure in the symbolic setting, that protocol is secure in the computational setting. Most computational soundness results that consider security against active attackers only consider so-called trace properties, e.g., [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] .
That is, they show that if, in the symbolic setting, a certain event does not occur, it does not occur in the computational setting, either. (Examples for such events would be that the adversary guesses a key or fakes an authentication.) Many security properties cannot be modeled using trace properties. Instead, we need equivalence-based properties. For example, anonymity would be modeled by stating that the protocol using identity a is indistinguishable from the protocol using identity b. A computational soundness result for such properties has been given by Cortier and ComonLundh [9] .
They show that if two processes are indistinguishable in the symbolic setting, then they are computationally indistinguishable in the computational setting. Their result is, however, restricted to a small class of processes. In particular, they disallow processes that contain loops. The reason for this is that, if a process contains a loop, it might run a superpolynomial number of steps. When comparing two processes P and Q, one of them might react immediately to any query, while the other might first enter a loop that takes a superpolynomial number of steps. These processes would be considered equivalent in the symbolic setting (in the symbolic setting there is no notion of polynomial-or superpolynomial-time). Thus, in order to get a computational soundness result that allows to deal with such processes, we need a computational notion of indistinguishability that treats P and Q as indistinguishable. Normal computational soundness cannot be used: When trying to prove the computational indistinguishability of P and Q, we have to invoke computational assumption (such as IND-CCA security) which do not necessarily hold when P or Q runs in superpolynomial-time (same problem as with the file servers from the motivating example). It was an open problem how to define the indistinguishability on the computational side in order to make computational soundness for equivalencebased security properties possible. 4 Tic-indistinguishability solves this problem. We show that symbolic indistinguishability implies computational indistinguishability. The parts of our proof related to computational soundness are quite separate from those related to tic-indistinguishability; thus our approach can be easily adapted to more complex settings.
II. TERMINATION-INSENSITIVE COMPUTATIONAL

INDISTINGUISHABILITY
In order to formally define the notion of ticindistinguishability, we first need to fix a machine model. As we will see in Section III, the precise choice of machine model is irrelevant. However, to derive and formally state this irrelevance, we first need some formalism that allows to express machines in different machine models. We will do this by first defining the concept of a machine, in a fashion independent of a particular machine model. Such a machine M is specified by a set of interfaces I M (over which it can interact with other machines), an initial state σ M , and a probabilistic state transition function δ M . In order to model non-termination, δ M can be partial, that is, the probabilities of the different outcomes do not need to add up to 1. The "missing probability" is then interpreted as the non-termination probability. The function δ M does not only output the new state and the message to be sent, but also outputs how much time passed during the current invocation. This allows to encode different machine models with different running times in our formalism.
Definition 4 (Machines):
A machine M consists of a nonempty set of interfaces I M , an initial state σ M , and a partial
means that the security parameter is η, the current state σ, and the message m arrives on interface ifc. If δ M returns (t, σ , ifc , m ), time t has passed, the new state is σ , and the message m is being sent on interface ifc .) We call a machine M terminating if δ M is total.
Given this notion of a machine, we can easily express different machine models in our setting. We simply define the set M of machines that exist with respect to the machine model under consideration.
Definition 5 (Machine model):
A machine model is a set of machines.
For example, we can define the machine model M Turing consisting of probabilistic Turing machines. This model contains all machines M where δ M is computable, and the running time that δ M returns corresponds to the running time a Turing machine would need for that computation.
Another example for a machine model is the model M 0 . M 0 is the set of all machines with zero running time.
Notice that M 0 is not a realistic machine model (it imposes no computational restrictions at all). Next, we need the concept of a network of machines. Since, at least in principle, a network of machines is nothing else than another machine simulating these machines, we model networks by just composing different machines. When composing machines A and B, we simply connect the interfaces that A and B share, and let all other interfaces be external interfaces (that can be connected with other machines when composing further).
Definition 6 (Composition of machines):
Given two machines A and B, we define the machine A + B as follows: I A+B := I A I B (symmetric set difference) and σ A+B := (σ A , σ B ). And δ A+B is the probabilistic function described by the following algorithm:
B := A and goto step 3.
Once we have composed a network of different machines into a single machine M with a single interface ifc (which is to be used to transport the initial input to and the final output of the network), the execution of the whole network is modeled by sending a single message to M on ifc and waiting for the answer. Machines with a single interface we call closed; the following definition also introduces notation to speak about the outcome of the execution of a network.
Definition 7 (Closed machines):
where ifc is the element of I M . Similarly, we write
(Intuitively, z is an auxiliary input given to the submachine of M that has the interface ifc.)
We can finally define tic-indistinguishability. We parametrize the notion over the machine model M the distinguisher Z is chosen from. Once one has decided on a particular machine model, M will be fixed.
Definition 8 (Tic-indistinguishability):
We write A ∼ B iff A and B are closed and I A = I B and for all polynomials p, there is a negligible function μ such that for all z, a, b ∈ {0, 1} * with a = b and all η ∈ AE, we have that
We call Z I-closing if I Z = I ∪ {ifc} for some ifc / ∈ I. We call two machines A and B termination-insensitively computationally indistinguishable with respect to a machine model
III. MACHINE-MODEL INDEPENDENCE
We proceed to show that tic-indistinguishability is independent of the machine model (assuming a reasonable machine model). In order to formalize this, we first need to define what it means for two machines to behave the same and to have polynomially-related running times (timeequivalence). In order to make the notion independent of the encoding of the internal state of the machines, we define time-equivalence by requiring that for any sequence of inputs (modeled by a machine Z that provides the inputs but does not, itself, use up running time), if one of the machines is able to perform a certain task (modeled by Z outputting 1) in polynomial time p, then the other machine can achieve the same task, with at least the same probability, in another (possibly larger) polynomial time q.
Definition 9 (Time-equivalence):
We say A is timemajorized by B (written A time B) if I A = I B and for any machine I A -closing Z ∈ M 0 and any polynomial p, there exists a polynomial q and a negligible function μ such that for all η ∈ AE and z ∈ {0, 1} * ,
We say A and B are time-equivalent (written
Notice that we only quantify over Z ∈ M 0 . This is for convenience only then we can refer to the running time of A by writing (A + Z) ⇓ q(η) 1. The machines in M 0 are not restricted in their computational abilities.
The relation time has two important properties (In order not to disturb the flow of this section, all proofs are deferred to Appendix A):
Notice that in this section and in Section IV, we never use the definition of time directly, instead we only use Lemmas 10 and 11. Thus, other definitions of time that satisfies these two lemmas would lead to a very similar notion of tic-indistinguishability and might be of independent interest.
From Lemma 11, we immediately get the following corollary that shows that ≈ time is closed under composition:
The importance of time stems from the fact that it allows to rewrite statements about tic-indistinguishability: 
Using the definition of time-majorization, we can define what it means for two machine models to be equivalent. Roughly speaking, two machine models are time-equivalent if whatever can be computed in one model can also be computed in the other model with only polynomial overhead.
Definition 16: Let machine models M and M be given. We say that M is time-majorized by M (M time M ) iff for any B ∈ M there is an A ∈ M such that A time B.
We call M and
Intuitively, M time M means that machine model M is more powerful (needs less time for the same computation) than M . Hence we expect that tic-indistinguishability with respect to M is a stronger requirement than ticindistinguishability with respect to M . This is captured by the following lemma. 
IV. PROPERTIES OF TIC-INDISTINGUISHABILITY
In this section, we describe some important properties of tic-indistinguishability. In order not to disturb the flow of this section, all proofs are deferred to Appendix B. The most elementary properties are reflexivity and symmetry and the fact that a non-terminating machine is indistinguishable from any other machine. Now, we show that tic-indistinguishability is closed under composition. This does not, however, hold for arbitrary machine models, but only for machine models that behave well under composition. We call such machine models closed.
Definition 21 (Closed machine models):
The composition lemma is very important because it allows us to reduce the tic-indistinguishability of a large system to the tic-indistinguishability of some simpler subsystem.
We now proceed to compare tic-indistinguishability to the classical notion of computational indistinguishability. We know that classical indistinguishability does not behave well if the machines we compare are not polynomial-time. If the machines do, however, only perform polynomial-time computations, then tic-indistinguishability should coincide with computational indistinguishability: The intuition behind tic-indistinguishability was to behave like computational indistinguishability except in the cases where a machine does not respond in polynomial time. In order to formalize this, we first need to identify the set of machines on which computational indistinguishability is "well-behaved": Following [2] , we call a machine reactively polynomial-time if it runs in polynomial-time with overwhelming probability as long as it only interacts with polynomial-time machines. (That is, if the machine runs superpolynomial time, another machine it interacts with "is to blame".) We formalize both the notions of polynomial time and reactive polynomial time:
Definition 23 (Polynomial time): We call a machine M polynomial-time with respect to ifc ∈ I M if M ∈ M Turing and there is a polynomial p such that for all terminating
We omit specifying ifc if it is clear from the context.
Definition 24 (Reactive polynomial time):
We call a machine M reactively polynomial-time if M ∈ M Turing and for all polynomial-time I M -closing Z, 6 there is a negligible function μ such that for all η ∈ AE and z ∈ {0, 1} * we have 
We can now formalize the relation between ticindistinguishability and computational indistinguishability. Namely, they coincide for reactively polynomial-time machines: Since only reactively polynomial-time machines are usually considered when using common notions of computational indistinguishability, and since on those machines tic-indistinguishability coincide with computational indistinguishability, one can see our notion as a generalization of previous notions.
Finally, we will find the following rewriting rule to be very useful. Finally, we investigate the relation between statistical indistinguishability and tic-indistinguishability. Unsurprisingly, statistical indistinguishability is the stronger notion and implies tic-indistinguishability. 
Definition 28 (Statistical indistinguishability): We call two machines
V. APPLICATION: COMPUTATIONAL SOUNDNESS
In what follows, we sketch how to get a computational soundness result for equivalence-based security properties (such as anonymity) by using tic-indistinguishability. In our exposition, we will focus on the proof steps related to ticindistinguishability while only sketching those that relate to established notions such as computational indistinguishability and statistical indistinguishability and that are thus more or less standard.
A. The symbolic model
To state our result, the first step is to define a symbolic protocol model. To keep our example simple, we follow the approach from [10] : Instead of introducing, e.g., a process calculus, we define a machine M sym that provides an interface for performing symbolic operations on messages. Any symbolic protocol P can then be expressed by specifying a machine M P that invokes M sym to perform operations on messages (such as symbolically computing an encryption, sending a message to the adversary, testing the equality of two messages). M sym internally represents all messages as terms; we first define the grammar of these terms:
where N ranges over an infinite set of nonces and K ranges over a fixed, finite set of key identifiers {K 1 , . . . , K m }. L ranges over an infinite set of abstract lengths. Intuitively, (M, M ) represents a pair of two messages. enc(pk(K), M, N) represents a public key encryption using the public key corresponding to K, the plaintext M , and the symbolic randomness N . (The symbolic randomness makes sure that two encryptions of the same message will not be equal.) garb L (N ) is a garbage term, representing some invalid value of length L. (The nonce N in garb L (N ) makes sure that we have infinitely many garbage terms for each L.) Notice that we have assumed a fixed, finite number of keys. For example, we might envision a PKI that assigns a single key pair for each party in a protocol. We restrict ourselves to a fixed number of keys in order to keep our example simple.
The abstract lengths L merit a word of explanation: Symbolically, one usually does not consider the length of messages. Computationally, a ciphertext usually reveals the length of a message. Thus, two protocols sending enc(K, M, N ) and enc(K, (M, M ), N) would not be indistinguishable in a computational setting, but typical symbolic modelings would consider these two protocols to be observationally equivalent. Thus observational equivalence would not carry over to the computational setting. To avoid this problem, we make sure that in our symbolic modeling, the adversary can distinguish the encryptions of two terms of different lengths. For this, we introduce the concept of an abstract length L. We do not specify how abstract lengths are encoded. L might range over integers and correspond to the actual lengths in the computational setting, or it might be some abstraction of the computational length. (For example, the abstract length of a term M might be the result of replacing all nonces and key identifiers in M by . ) We assume a function L mapping terms to abstract lengths, the length function. L(M ) is the abstract length we assign to a term M . Of course, L must in some way be an abstraction of the actual length in the computational setting, we will make this formal below in Section V-C, Definition 34.
We can now define the machine M sym .
Definition 30 (Term machine):
The machine M sym has interfaces I Msym = {proto, adv}. It maintains two lists S P , S A of terms (representing the knowledge of the protocol and the adversary, respectively). On interface proto, M sym reacts to the following messages:
• nonce(): Pick a fresh nonce N and append N to S P . Send |S P | on proto. (That is, the index in S P of the newly created message is returned.)
• pair(m 1 , m 2 ): Append (S P m1 , S P m2 ) to S P and send |S P | on proto.
• fst(m):
• snd(m):
, append M 2 to S P and send |S P | on proto.
• equal(m 1 , m 2 ): If S On interface adv, M sym reacts to the same messages as on proto (with S P and S A as well as proto and adv exchanged), and M sym additionally reacts to the following messages:
• whichkey(m):
Using this definition, we can then model a protocol using a machine M P that may have an arbitrarily complex description (and that is supposed to model all parties in the protocol), and that invokes M sym over the interface proto whenever a symbolic operation on terms is required. Furthermore, M P interacts with the adversary by sending send(m) on proto. In this case, M sym interacts with an adversary over the interface adv until it receives another message send(m ) on adv which is then passed back to the protocol.
Notice that the adversary does not see the actual terms. Like the protocol he can only query M sym in order to construct new terms or learn something about existing terms. Thus M sym does not only model the capabilities of the protocol but also the capabilities of the adversary. Then, we define two protocols M P and M Q as observationally equivalent if no adversary can distinguish between M P + M sym and M Q + M sym .
Definition 31 (Observational equivalence):
A symbolic machine is a machine M whose state transition function δ M is deterministic and independent of the security parameter (its first argument).
Two symbolic machines M P and M Q with interfaces I MP = I MQ = {proto} are called observationally equivalent if for all symbolic machines Z with I Z = {adv, ifc}, we have that
Notice that we have considered only protocols M P , M Q and adversaries Z that are deterministic and independent of the security parameter. This is to be closer to typical symbolic models. All the results in this sections could, however, also be shown without this restriction. For example, one might consider arbitrary machines M P and M Q to be observationally equivalent if M P + M sym and M Q + M sym are statistically indistinguishable.
The notion of observational equivalence we have defined here is defined quite differently from the notion of observational equivalence as it is usually defined in, say, a process calculus. See Section V-E below for a discussion on how our techniques carry over to common definitions of observational equivalence.
B. The computational model
In order to state the fact that observational equivalence carries over from the symbolic model to the computational model, we need to define the latter. Fortunately, we are already half there: Protocols are described by machines M P that issue instructions (over interface proto) how to operate on messages. If we compose M P with M sym , we get a symbolic model. But if we instead define a machine M comp that behaves like M sym from the point of view of M P , but that internally operates on bitstrings, and that sends bitstrings to the adversary, then M P + M comp describes a computational execution of the protocol.
In the definition of M comp , we assume that we are given an IND-CCA secure encryption scheme (KeyGen, Enc, Dec). In slight overload of notation, (m 1 , m 2 ) denotes a pair of bitstrings encoded as a bitstring.
Definition 32 (Computational term machine):
The machine M comp ∈ M Turing has interfaces I Msym = {proto, cadv}. It maintains a list S P of bitstrings. For each key K i , it initially picks a key pair (pk i , sk i ) ← KeyGen(1 η ). It reacts to the following messages on interface proto:
• nonce(): Pick n $ ← {0, 1} η and append n to S P . Send |S P | on proto.
• enc(k, m): Compute c ← Enc(pk k , S P m ), append c to S P , and send |S P | on proto.
• dec(k, m):
, append p to S P , and send |S P | on proto.
, send yes on proto. Otherwise send no.
• send(m): Send S P m on cadv.
• In all other cases (or if an undefined S P m , K k is accessed or if Dec fails), send the empty string on proto.
Upon a message b ∈ {0, 1}
* on adv, append b to S P and send (msg, |S P |) on proto.
Notice that in this definition, the adversary does not query M comp in order to perform computations on messages. Instead, when the protocol sends a message (stored as a bitstring in S P ) to the adversary, the adversary gets the actual bitstring and may perform arbitrary operations on it. Similarly, the adversary does not need to invoke operations on M comp to construct messages, he can send an arbitrary bitstring to the protocol. This models the computational setting in which the adversary is only limited by its computational abilities.
Given the definition of M comp , we can easily define what it means for two protocols to be indistinguishable in the computational setting:
Definition 33 (Computational observational equivalence):
Notice the fact that we require only tic-indistinguishability here, not computational indistinguishability. This is because two observationally equivalent machines M P and M Q might represent two protocols that may enter very long loops. If the time spent in these loops is exponential, the IND-CCA security of the encryption scheme cannot be applied, and we cannot derive
Thus we cannot not show computational soundness. With tic-indistinguishability we do not run into this problem.
C. Computational soundness
We have defined observational equivalence (in the symbolic setting) and computational observational equivalence. Before we can relate the two notions, we need one last missing component: We need to define what it means for the length function L to be a reasonable abstraction of the actual length. Namely, we require that from L(M ), it is possible to compute the length that a bitstring b M corresponding to M would have.
Definition 34 (Valid length function):
We call the length function valid if there is an efficiently computable and efficiently invertible function (implicitly depending on the security parameter) from abstract lengths to AE such that for any term M the following holds:
Given M , recursively compute a bitstring b M as follows:
We can now state our computational soundness result: 
D. Proof
Before we can begin, we need to slightly tweak M comp . The problem with M comp is that it is not reactively polynomial-time (Definition 24): By performing n queries, we can produce a bitstring of exponential length (e.g., we can start with x 0 := N and compute x i+1 := (x i , x i ) using i + 1 pair-queries on proto). To work around this issue, we define a variation of M comp : Note: In order to understand the parts of this proof that are related to the notion of tic-indistinguishability, it is not necessary to understand the definition of Sim. In this case, Definition 41 and the proofs of Lemmas 42 and 43 can be skipped.
Definition 41 (Simulator):
The machine Sim has interfaces I Sim = {adv, cadv}. In the first invocation, it computes
• We can now show that the simulator Sim indeed performs a good simulation. This is the hardest part of the proof (in particular when giving a more detailed proof), but fortunately, it is completely unrelated to tic-indistinguishability, but instead uses the traditional notion of computational indistinguishability. In order to be able to show this, we first make sure that any execution involving the simulator Sim and a polynomial-time adversary runs in polynomial time. Otherwise, we would not be able to use computational assumption (IND-CCA in our case) in the proof. (pk k , b m ) .
By construction, M 
. By fixing the randomness of Z and hard-coding η, z, we get a symbolic machine Z such that Pr[(
Since Z , M sym , M P , M Q are all symbolic machines, the argument η is ignored, and we have
7 A precise treatment of this step would involve an inductive argument that relates the states of M cheat sym + Sim 1 and M * comp after each invocation. We omit such a detailed proof here because it is completely unrelated to tic-indistinguishability.
This contradicts the observational equivalence of M P and
By Lemma 29, we get
E. Discussion
We have sketched how to do a computational soundness proof for observational equivalence using ticindistinguishability. However, our definition of observational equivalence (in the symbolic setting) is very different from the way observational equivalence is usually defined. Commonly, observational equivalence on processes is defined as the largest equivalence relation that is closed under the application of contexts and that guarantees that two equivalent processes perform the same observable actions (see, e.g., [11] ). We have chosen the non-standard definition in order not to make our example too complex. In order to get a computational soundness proof for a typical process calculus with a standard definition of observational equivalence, one can take our result as a starting point. Then, given two processes P and Q, one defines machines M P and M Q that simulate the processes P and Q, respectively. Then one shows that if P and Q are observationally equivalent, no machine interacting with M P + M sym or M Q + M sym can distinguish between the two. This implies that M P and M Q are observationally equivalent with respect to our definition, and our computational soundness result can then be applied.
Another limitation of our result is that the operations a protocol may perform are quite limited. Only encryption is supported, only a fixed set of key pairs can be used, public keys cannot be transmitted over the network, etc. State-ofthe-art computational soundness results support many more operations (e.g., [6] supports encryptions, signatures, and hashes, [12] supports zero-knowledge proofs, [8] allows to transmit public keys). We believe, however, that the techniques used in those papers can easily be incorporated into our approach, they would mainly affect the construction of the simulator and Lemmas 42 and 43, but not touch the proof steps related to tic-indistinguishability. 
Let Z ∈ M 0 be a machine with interfaces I Z = {ifc, ifc } for some ifc = ifc and with the following behavior: When receiving x on ifc , send x on ifc. When receiving a η on ifc, send 1 on ifc , and when receiving y = a η on ifc, send 0 on ifc .
Since A time A , there is a polynomial q and a negligible function μ such that for all η, z, we have
We then have
For ( * ), note that Z, being in M 0 , does not increase the running time.
Since q+p is a polynomial, and ν is not upper-bounded by a negligible function, it follows that A ∼ B. This contradicts A ∼ B, so our assumption that A ∼ B holds was false.
Proof of Lemma 11. Assume A time B. Fix an I A I Cclosing machine Z ∈ M 0 and a polynomial p. To show A + C time B + C, we have to construct a polynomial q and a negligible function μ such that
Let ifc be the interface such that I Z = (I A I C )∪ {ifc}. We construct an I A -closing machine Z * ∈ M 0 that does the following: It simulates C + Z. When Z outputs x on the interface ifc, Z * outputs y on ifc, where y is defined as follows: If x = 1 and the total time spent by the simulated C is less-equal p(η), y := 1. Let ifc be the element of I Z \ I A . Let Z p be a machine that does the following: When activated with message (z, b) on interface ifc, 8 it activates a simulated Z with message z on interface ifc. Messages sent/received by Z on interfaces other than ifc are forwarded. When Z runs more than a total number of p(η) steps, Z p aborts and outputs 0 on ifc. When Z outputs m on ifc, Z checks whether m = b, and, if so, sends 1 on ifc, otherwise it sends 0 on ifc.
Notice that, since Z ∈ M Turing , Z p can be implemented by a polynomial-time Turing machine. Thus Z p can be chosen to be polynomial-time.
By construction of Z p , for a = b we have that 
